The mapping
| Function | Before (PSA era) | After (CSPA era) |
|---|---|---|
| Public conduct complaints | OIPRD — screened; most investigated by the officer's own chief; Director could retain | LECA — same continuation, same structural feature: most conduct complaints still investigated by the officer's own service; Complaints Director may investigate, including without a complaint |
| Discipline appeals | OCPC adjudicative division | CSPA Part XII adjudicators |
| Investigations of chiefs, boards, board members | OCPC investigative division (Sinclair/Thunder Bay; Durham) | Inspector General of Policing — inspections, directions, board-member sanctions |
| Budget disputes, amalgamation/abolition | OCPC | IG framework / arbitration stream |
| Labour arbitration | Ontario Police Arbitration Commission | OPAAC (continued, renamed, adjudication added) |
| Serious injury/death investigations | SIU | SIU (unchanged) |
What the public explicitly lost
- The policy/service complaint. Under the PSA, a member of the public could complain about a service's policies or services — not just an individual officer's conduct. The CSPA routes policy concerns to boards themselves and systemic adequacy to the IG, who inspects on his own program; the freestanding public right to lodge a policy complaint and receive a disposition is gone. Complaints about the institution were converted into complaints about individuals — precisely backwards from what the systemic record shows matters.
- The OCPC's board-investigation instrument as publicly triggerable. Requests for investigation ended April 1, 2024; the IG inspects, but on inspection logic, not complaint logic.
- Continuity of the record. The OCPC's investigation inventory was never published, its KPI reporting terminates as "N/A due to its dissolution," and no public disposition of its files exists — the subject of this site's FIPPA request. An oversight body's unpublished findings should not be dissolvable with it.
What the public arguably gained
- An Inspector General with standing inspection powers, data authority, and published inspection reports — systemic oversight that no longer waits for a crisis-triggered request (the Durham monitoring is its early test).
- LECA's own-motion investigation power — conduct scrutiny without a complainant to retaliate against (a feature the reprisal-saturated Thunder Bay record argues for).
- Codified board-member conduct standards and IG sanctions — the gap Sinclair's report exposed now has an instrument.
Comparative resourcing of OIPRD/OCPC (before) versus LECA/IOP (after) is FOI-buildable and will be added to the table before per-body comparisons ship.
The OCPC records problem
On April 1, 2024, the body that investigated police chiefs, officers, and boards stopped taking new matters. Its functions scattered three ways; its performance reporting simply ends — Tribunals Ontario's KPI page states that after September 1, 2025, OCPC data "will be noted as N/A due to its dissolution."
What the OCPC never published: a comprehensive list of its investigations. What has not been publicly accounted for: where its investigative files went at dissolution — including the completed-but-withheld Durham report and every other unpublished investigation record. Regulation 125/24 governs transitional matters; no public inventory of transferred or archived investigation files exists. The successor bodies inherit "new cases," not an obligation to account for the old ones.